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Pricing climate risk mitigation 
 
Joseph E. Aldy 
 
Adaptation and geoengineering responses to climate change should be taken in account when 
estimating the social cost of carbon.  
 
At the September 2014 UN climate summit, 73 countries and more than 1,000 companies 
advocated for ‘pricing carbon’1. Economists have long called for pricing carbon to reflect the 
social damages associated with the impacts of carbon dioxide emissions on the global 
climate2,3. Such an approach generally reflects the ‘polluter pays principle’ – as elaborated in 
the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development – with its emphasis on the use 
of economic instruments to internalize environmental costs4. Scholars have also called for 
organizing international negotiations around agreement on a carbon price as the basis for 
emission commitments5,6. 
 
The meaning of carbon pricing 
 
For some policymakers, setting a price on carbon that reflects the cost of carbon pollution 
can inform the ‘objective’ of climate policy. For example, the US Government uses an 
estimate of the social cost of carbon (SCC) – the present value monetized damages 
associated with an incremental ton of carbon dioxide emissions – to evaluate fuel economy 
standards, appliance efficiency standards, and carbon performance standards7. Because 
some laws require regulations to reflect a weighting of benefits and costs, the application of 
the SCC could determine the ambition of energy and climate policies.  
 
For other policymakers, pricing carbon is an ‘instrument’ of climate policy – such as 
carbon dioxide cap-and-trade programs or a carbon tax. For example, the EU Emission 
Trading Scheme and the British Columbia carbon tax impose a price that carbon dioxide 
emitters must bear. Of course, these two interpretations can be mutually reinforcing. In a 
benefit-cost framework, a policy that maximizes net social benefits would equate the social 
cost of carbon and the price borne by emitters under a tax or cap-and-trade instrument8.  
 
Whether the SCC determines the objective of policy, informs the design of a pricing 
instrument, or serves as a focal point in international negotiations, it will play an important 
role in the future of climate change policy. The social damages of carbon emissions will 
depend on the impacts of a warming world, such as sea level rise, extreme weather events, 
changes in agricultural productivity, as well as potential catastrophic harms, migration and 
conflict, etc.9. The SCC will also vary with alternative efforts to mitigate climate change risks, 
such as adaptation and geoengineering. Thus, it is important to conceptualize the SCC in the 
context of the full suite of climate change risk management policies.   
 
Managing risks posed by climate change  
 
Policymakers, individuals, and businesses can use three general approaches to mitigate the 
risks posed by climate change. First, they can halt the atmospheric accumulation of 
greenhouse gases, thereby preventing the problem, through emission abatement. Second, 
they can avoid some climate change impacts by making investments in adaptation and 
resilience. Third, they can attempt to ‘fix’ the problem through geoengineering, such as 
solar radiation management strategies. 
 
This multi-pronged approach to mitigating climate risk has emerged only recently in 
the debate over climate change policy. In the 1990s, international and domestic climate 
change policy focused almost exclusively on emission abatement. In the early 2000s, 
adaptation joined emission abatement in multilateral negotiations as well as development 
policy. In recent years, scholars have raised the prospect of geoengineering paired with 
emission abatement to avoid potentially catastrophic climate change10-12. Putting a price on 
carbon for emission abatement that fails to account for adaptation and geoengineering risks 
could leave too few resources for adaptation and geoengineering, options with potentially 
high returns in reducing climate change damages. 
 
Pricing carbon in a world with adaptation and geoengineering  
 
Pricing carbon within a comprehensive risk management framework requires continued 
work and advances in our understanding of climate change damages. Scholars from an array 
of disciplines have raised questions about the damage functions in the integrated 
assessment models that generate SCC estimates9,13,14. Improving the knowledge base on 
impacts is a necessary foundation for evaluating the risk mitigation impacts of emission 
abatement, adaptation, and geoengineering. 
 
The status quo integrated assessment model approach produces a SCC without 
consideration of geoengineering and typically with incomplete or ad hoc attempts to 
represent adaptation15. Of the more than 400,000 SCC estimates produced by the US 
Government in its 2013 report, 160 scenarios had a SCC in excess of $1,000 per ton – or 
nearly $10,000 in annual climate damages per US household for its residential energy 
consumption. It is difficult to imagine that in such dire states of the world there would be no 
increase in adaptation investment or geoengineering deployment to offset at least some of 
these impacts.  
 
Many individuals and businesses have strong incentives to mitigate their exposure to 
climate change-related risks. If the impacts of climate change become more severe, then 
they will increase private adaptation investments. Moreover, governments will likely 
increase outlays for resilience and adaptation if climate risks become more pronounced.  
 
Adaptation will not fully offset the increase in damages, but it likely will offset some 
climate change risk. As a result, the integrated assessment framework for evaluating the 
damages of an incremental emission of carbon dioxide should be expanded to include an 
‘adaptation response function’. Such a function (or system of functions) would represent 
how adaptation actions by governments and private agents respond to climate change, how 
adaptation affects the residual damages associated with another ton of carbon dioxide in 
the air, and how much this adaptation costs. This adaptation response function would result 
in lower monetized damages – because adaptation reduces the impacts of a changing 
climate – and an opportunity cost for these adaptation investments. If adaptation 
investments only occur when their returns (benefits of climate risk reduction) exceed their 
costs, then on net this adaptation function approach would result in a lower SCC than the 
status quo approach. If private agents, however, make adaptation investments that are 
privately welfare-improving, but impose local negative externalities (e.g., damming a 
waterway), then the social costs of carbon could increase when accounting for adaptation 
response. 
 
Similarly, a ‘geoengineering response function’ could be incorporated into integrated 
assessment models. Such a function would likely focus on state behavior and, possibly, 
multilateral coordination. This response function could represent a future multilateral 
governance regime, especially if such a regime provided clear guidance on the use of 
geoengineering. Alternatively, the response function could model the incentives and 
behavior of various countries likely to react to adverse climate impacts through unilateral 
geoengineering actions. Just as in the case of adaptation response, a geoengineering 
response would likely reduce some climate risks (e.g., temperature-related impacts) at the 
cost of designing and implementing the geoengineering actions. It’s important to recognize 
that these costs would include those associated with launching the geoengineering solution 
(e.g., injecting reflective particles into the stratosphere) as well as possible unintended side 
effects. Based on the first-order effects, accounting for geoengineering response would 
likely reduce the SCC – again through lower impacts net of the direct cost of implementing 
geoengineering – but the unintended side effects may increase social losses and could 
potentially offset the social gains from geoengineering. 
 
Constructing such response functions requires, at a minimum, research on three 
dimensions of the problem. First, greater spatial and temporal resolution in estimating 
impacts can inform the consideration of adaptation and the incentives for any given state to 
launch geoengineering. Second, the construction of such response functions should 
explicitly enable uncertainty analysis. Just as there uncertainties in how emissions translate 
into impacts, meaningful uncertainties characterize the form, timing, and efficacy of 
adaptation and geoengineering responses. Third, these functions could inform a richer 
application of game theory, drawing from international relations and economics, to 
understand the likely reactions of countries to a changing climate and the prospects for 
building a credible international climate policy architecture. Since the incentives for free-
riding differ dramatically across these three general approaches16, explicit modeling of 
behaviour may be important in constructing the response functions.  
 
Policy implications 
 
A conventional economic approach to this kind of risk management problem would call for 
evaluating the returns (say, in reduced damages) associated with incremental investments 
along each of these three approaches. A policy that maximizes the risk reduction for a given 
expenditure of resources would equate the marginal return on emission abatement with the 
marginal return on adaptation with the marginal return on geoengineering. This is simply an 
extension of the same cost-effectiveness analysis that underlies the case for putting a 
common price on carbon across all emission sources to maximize emission reductions for a 
given expenditure of resources on abatement. Even if there is no explicit policy effort to 
equate the marginal returns to actions along these three approaches, the avoided damages 
associated with emission abatement will likely be affected by adaptation and 
geoengineering responses that could occur in the future.  
 
The use of a SCC enhances the transparency of public decision-making and can 
facilitate the identification of opportunities to mitigate climate change risks. The failure to 
meaningfully slow the growth in global greenhouse gas emissions in recent decades 
suggests that driving emission abatement through carbon pricing is important, but only part 
of the risk management portfolio. There will be hard decisions in the future. Policymakers 
will need rigorous tools that account for all available climate change risk management 
options to inform these decisions.  
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